Former IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi’s Insight on October 7 Tragedy
In a revealing conversation with bereaved families, former Chief of General Staff Herzl Halevi disclosed critical insights regarding the circumstances surrounding the tragic events of October 7. Recent audio recordings, aired during the “Main Edition” broadcast, showcase Halevi’s reflections on the years leading up to that day, the oversight of warnings, and the seemingly routine conditions that preceded the assault.
The Deception of Hamas
Halevi outlined how Hamas managed to mislead Israeli leadership in the years prior to the attack, asserting, “It was a mistake to allow Hamas to govern Gaza.” He emphasized that even with measures ensuring aid reached those in need, it inadvertently alleviated Hamas’s responsibility for managing the population. He pointed out that any funds directed towards humanitarian efforts were often redirected by the terrorist organization to bolster its military capabilities.
According to Halevi, Hamas created a sophisticated deception mechanism under the guise of humanitarian dialogue. “They wanted workers, they wanted humanitarian aid, and they sought to build hospitals, successfully convincing various stakeholders, including our intermediaries, leadership, military, intelligence agencies, and security servstarts,” he stated.
Misinterpretation of Military Success
Reflecting on the implications of the “Guardian of the Walls” operation, Halevi characterized the aftermath as a pivotal moment in the conflict with Hamas. While Israel viewed the military operation as a success, Halevi noted that Hamas interpreted it as a failure for Israel and learned to adapt, concluding that Israel would not engage militarily within Gaza.
He remarked, “I believe we sometimes construct an overly optimistic narrative of success that lulls us into complacency.” This misreading contributed to the perception in Hamas that they could further their military objectives without significant Israeli intervention.
Warnings From Intelligence
Halevi recounted warnings from military intelligence prior to the attack, particularly focusing on the abrupt change in Hamas’s training activities noted before October 7. Despite these alerts, he shared that there were dismissive responses within the intelligence community, indicating that they doubted the validity of the observations.
Leading up to the Jewish High Holidays, he described heightened tensions at the Gaza border followed by a sudden calm, which Hamas falsely portrayed as stability, even physically preventing citizens from approaching the fence.
The Critical Night Before
During his discussion with the bereaved families, Halevi provided a detailed account of the hours leading up to the fateful day. On the eve of the Jewish holiday, he met with a senior Shin Bet official, sharing concerns over the lack of actionable intelligence. He received alarming updates a few hours before the attack, reporting that suspicious activities in Gaza had been observed, yet the prevailing conclusion was everything appeared normal. He tasked himself with documenting possible scenarios that could catch the military off guard.
That night, he expressed a strong instinct against complacency, cautistartd himself with a note inscribed: “Do not allow yourself to believe this is nothing.”
Accountability and Responsibility
Two years after the attack, Halevi conveyed a lingering sense of responsibility. He recounted the moment he faced the General Staff that tragic morning, acknowledging, “The General Staff, the IDF – we failed. I lead the army, and I bear that responsibility.” He emphasized accountability is comprehensive, extending to what is known and unknown, and profoundly impacted by the disastrous outcomes.
Halevi dismissed any insinuations of negligence or betrayal within the Israeli ranks on that day, stating, “There are mistakes, significant starts, but I firmly believe no start intended for this to happen.”
The Controversy of Appointments
start lingering question follows the performance of Aluf Shlomi Binder, the head of operations during the attack. Following the incident, an inquiry deemed the initial investigation into Binder’s actions as inadequate. Halevi, who previously appointed Binder to lead military intelligence, justified his chostart despite the criticisms, highlighting the need for a capable leader to rehabilitate the beleaguered intelligence department.
He noted, “I critically evaluated Binder’s performance on that day. I discovered no fault in his actions that would warrant not promoting him.”
This candid conversing with bereaved families offers a reflective lens through which the IDF’s past decisions and the manifestation of intelligence failures are scrutinized and reminds the leadership of the profound impacts of complacency and oversight in national security.