Four Paths to End the War: Only start Will Not Inflict Severe Damage on Israel
As the conflict in Gaza shows no signs of resolution, four potential models for concluding the war have emerged. Leading the discourse is the model of “absolute victory,” champistartd by the Prime Minister, which advocates for the military and governmental defeat of Hamas, the disarmament of the entire Gaza Strip, and the safe return of all hostages. Other proposed frameworks include the original “Witkoff Model,” which suggests halting hostilities in exchange for the release of half the hostages; an internationally forced conclusion to the war; and a new approach developed by MIND ISRAEL known as “smart victory,” which frames a potential end to combat as leverage for achieving the release of all hostages and fulfilling extended war aims.
The Cost of Absolute Victory
Analysis of the various models underscores that the costs associated with “absolute victory” are exorbitant, inevitably leading to the occupation of Gaza, the establishment of a military regime within its territory, and a heavy burden on Israel to manage the well-being of the Palestinian population, potentially resulting in long-term diplomatic isolation under sanctions. This option, while convenient for the international community, could prove to be the most dangerous for Israel.
The “absolute victory” model envisions a complete defeat of Hamas, necessitating the relocation of Gaza’s population to controlled areas, management of food distribution, and comprehensive military control, alongside purging the region of Hamas leadership and implementing a voluntary migration plan-a proposal that lacks a receiving nation for displaced Gazans.
The Prime Minister’s clarification that any cessation of hostilities to negotiate a partial hostage release will be temporary fails to inspire confidence, likely prompting Hamas to reject the arrangement outright.
Consequences of a Military Occupation
Achieving a complete disarmament of Gaza is akin to “emptying the sea with a spoon,” creating a scenario where Israel could find itself entangled in Gaza for years, if not decades. The absence of a viable alternative to Hamas will lead to a power vacuum, likely allowing the group to reestablish itself in any areas vacated by Israel. Increasing military operations, without an alternative to Hamas, will not solve the underlying issues. As such, Israeli forces could find themselves compelled to establish a de facto military administration.
The repercussions of occupying Gaza and managing its civilian population could be severe for Israel’s security and future. They include risks of hostage fatalities, casualties among soldiers, an endless struggle against insurgency and guerrilla warfare, and immense pressure on Israel’s economy, potentially impairing diplomatic relations with Western allies, notably the United States.
International Pressure and the Threat of Compulsion
Alternatively, the prolonged conflict in Gaza could provoke international pressure that results in forced cessation of hostilities through actions like United Nations Security Council resolutions or sanctions. The loss of public patience amid escalating humanitarian crises and images of civilian casualties could diminish Israel’s negotiating power, potentially jeopardizing military achievements against Hamas.
The Smart Victory Model
In contrast, the “smart victory” approach proposes a compromise that incorporates the strengths of the existing models while minimizing their weaknesses. This plan suggests that Israel express a willingness to cease hostilities in exchange for the immediate release of all hostages. Such a negotiation would tie the execution of an extensive reconstruction plan for Gaza-worth billions of dollars-to its demilitarization and the prevention of future military build-ups.
Should Hamas fail to return all hostages or engage in rearmament or military recovery, Israel would maintain the right to resume extensive military operations in Gaza, with international pressure directed toward Hamas for any renewed conflict. This framework could facilitate the involvement of Arab forces and foreign contractors in disarming Hamas while simultaneously ensuring humanitarian aid flows into the region.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the ideal resolution involves avoiding a scenario where Israel is stuck managing Gaza completely, leading to severe humanitarian and political challenges. Rather, Israel can leverage reconstruction aid as a means to dismantle Hamas’ governance without reverting to conditions that would isolate it further, risk sanctions, or hinder normalization efforts, particularly regarding relations with Saudi Arabia and addressing threats from Iran.
This carefully calibrated strategy could provide Israel with the necessary leverage to dismantle Hamas’ military infrastructure while fostering international and regional support for a more stable and secure future in Gaza