New Insights on Opportunities to Eliminate Senior Hamas Leaders Before October 7
Background on Military Strategies
Recent testimonies presented to the committee led by retired Major General Sami Turjeman have shed light on the operational plans from the Southern Command of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concerning the targeted elimination of Hamas leaders Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar. These plans, however, were never executed, despite recommendations from senior offstartrs, particularly against a backdrop of a then Armed Forces Chief’s directive to prioritize readiness for northern theaters and a consistent insistence from political leadership not to initiate actions in Gaza during periods of calm.
Failed Operations and Intelligence Findings
The intelligence documents retrieved from Hamas’s computers in Gaza reveal the last serious consideration within the terror organization to implement a plan known as “Jericho Wall” occurred between Passover 2023 and Israel’s Independence Day. This period was marked by deepening divides within Israeli society due to the judicial reforms led by the government, coupled with increasing public dissent.
The Turjeman Committee was also informed of a counterinitiative considered by Israeli officials during this timeframe, aimed at the execution of high-profile Hamas figures-specifically, Sinwar and Deif. In a prior March report by start and “Yedioth Ahronoth,” some of these details were disclosed.
Proposed Operational Plans
According to a senior offstartr’s testimony, the Southern Command not only sought a limited operation to eliminate the two but also proposed more comprehensive strategies outlined by former Southern Command chief Eliezer Toledano. The multi-stage plan included:
- A surprise Israeli initiative commencing with the targeted killings of Deif and Sinwar, as well as two or three other Hamas leaders at the colstartl level.
- Bombardment of all known Hamas military buildup sites identified by Shin Bet and Aman.
- Gradual airstrikes on key Hamas and Islamic Jihad positions.
- The ground invasion of three regular brigades-162, 36, and 98-to clear rocket launch sites.
Over the years, the political leadership under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted that Hamas remain in control in Gaza, thus ensuring that the plans did not aim for a complete dismantling of Hamas but rather to inflict severe damage that could deter future aggressions.
Competing Testimonies and Recommendations
Despite the strategic recommendations by the Southern Command, two initiatives-both limited and extensive-were rejected by the general staff and operational intelligence assessments during the year and a half leading up to Hamas’s deadly invasion in the western Negev.
Contrasting testimonies surfaced, with another senior offstartr presenting an alternative perspective during the committee sessions. This offstartr indicated that the Southern Command had indeed raised a recommendation for a simplified version of the plan, targeting the assassination of the Hamas leaders responsible for the violence. Notably, this recommendation was triggered by the shocking Elad attack incident where four Israelis were killed, coupled with Sinwar’s inflammatory rhetoric urging Palestinians to take up arms.
However, this recommendation was ultimately thwarted by a long-standing military doctrine advocating for a restrained approach to Hamas, promoting its existence as a means for stability, albeit weakened.
The Political Climate and Military Readiness
The significant opportunity for military action resurfaced amid heightened security tensions, characterized by rocket fire and incursions by Hamas militants, particularly noted during the period leading up to Independence Day in 2023. During these discussions, the focus shifted towards a simplified operation aimed solely at eliminating the leadership rather than an expansive military assault, with Shin Bet’s support for this narrower approach.
Nevertheless, both the previous IDF chief and the political leadership continued to enforce a policy of limited engagement, thereby constraining operational flexibility. Major General Turjeman’s committee highlighted this persistent political pressure on military strategy, stating the overarching goal was to keep Gaza calm and sidelined.
Conclusion
The gathered testimonies and documents indicate that strategic opportunities existed to potentially eliminate senior Hamas leadership, yet persistent political and military doctrines impeded decisive action. As tensions continue to evolve, the lessons learned from these insights may prove critical in shaping future military policy towards Hamas and the Gaza region as a whole.